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Keynes and the International Clearing Union: A Possible Model for Eurozone Reform? 
 
Abstract 
 
Economic and monetary union in Europe, as currently constituted, has a number of structural 
weaknesses. Large, persistent international payments imbalances necessitate deficit nations to 
deflate their economies or squeeze social wages in order to restore competitiveness. Surplus 
nations accrue reserves, with little pressure to maintain related contribution to spending 
power in the real economy. The asymmetric treatment of credit and debit nations reduces 
aggregate demand in the Eurozone. This paper examines a solution, first proposed by Keynes, 
whereby symmetrical treatment of balance of payments transactions may promote economic 
growth and higher levels of employment. It outlines the key features of the system and 
highlights the relevance of the solution to the issues faced by the Eurozone. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The 2008 international financial crisis, which was triggered by problems related to sub-prime 
housing loans and securitisation via collateralized loan obligations and credit default swops, 
led to a deep economic recession across most of the industrialized world. Subsequent actions, 
undertaken in order to prevent the onset of a worsening economic depression, have 
contributed towards sovereign debt problems for certain Eurozone member states, and a 
general worsening of budgetary positions for the remainder. These events have highlighted 
not only the fragility of the European banking system, but additionally the flaws in design of 
the particular form of economic and monetary union (EMU) established amongst a number of 
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European Union (EU) member states. The tensions caused by the financial crisis have not 
caused these problems, however, but rather magnified or highlighted the existence of pre-
existing weaknesses which have long been recognised by a selection of the academic 
commentators who have written on this topic over the past two decades (Eichengreen, 1992; 
de Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke, 1993; Burkett et al, 1996; Arestis and Sawyer, 2000). 
Moreover, it is not only the design of EMU and the rules established to limit participation to 
suitable candidate nations, which have been found to be at fault, but also the economic 
architecture introduced in an attempt to sustain this new arrangement (Degryse, 2012, p. 6). 
 
The response to these problems has been three-fold. Firstly, the EU member states have 
sought to provide emergency loans, to assist EMU members in immediate and pressing 
difficulties, to prevent nations being forced to leave the single currency or, indeed, for EMU 
to disintegrate. This has been called the “kicking the can down the road” approach, as it does 
not solve fundamental problems, but might create the time and space for this to occur. 
Financial assistance has evolved into a more substantive European stability mechanism 
(ESM), providing financial loans subject to the implementation of austerity measures, 
combining reforms in national labour and/or social policy, intended to reduce public 
expenditure.1 This ‘fiscal compact’ is the second aspect (Degryse, 2012). The third element is 
the ongoing negotiation of a tighter set of budgetary rules, tightening the former stability and 
growth pact (SGP), by having more restrictive limits on budget deficits and stricter 
enforcement of any breaches of these new rules (EU Commission, 2011).2 
 
This response is, at best, likely to be a temporary relief for Eurozone members, as it does not 
address some of the fundamental issues inherent within any fixed (or single) currency 
                                                 
1
 http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm; 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/efsm/index_en.htm 
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/giovannini/giovannini081100en.pdf 
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arrangement. In the absence of much stronger variants of fiscal federalism, the stabilisation of 
the single currency zone is problematic, given the persistence of asymmetric shocks 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993; de Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke, 1993, p. 112-125). 
Moreover, the policy reforms fail to deal with large, persistent payments imbalances between 
participating member states, nor the resultant increased demand for international reserves, 
which has the unfortunate consequence of reducing Eurozone aggregate demand (Stiglitz and 
Greenwald, 2010, p. 12). The adoption of a single currency precludes the use of the exchange 
rate as an ameliorating instrument. Thus shifts in international competitiveness are more 
difficult to resolve, except through deficit nations adopting general deflationary measures 
and/or policies aimed at reducing real or social wages (Keynes, 1980, p. 29). Little 
commensurate pressure is exerted upon surplus nations to seek a balance to their international 
payments account. Indeed, the policy responses to the current Eurozone difficulties reflects 
this asymmetric treatment of credit and debit nations, with the burden of resolution firmly 
placed upon those nations already struggling with public debt and international 
competitiveness problems. 
 
There is, however, an alternative approach, that could be adapted to the Eurozone, and which 
would promote an agenda favouring employment and growth, rather than fiscal retrenchment 
and deflation. It would promote social cohesion and solidarity between member states, by 
imposing symmetrical responsibilities upon surplus as well as deficit nations. It would 
resolve many of the fundamental structural weaknesses with the current form of EMU, and 
thereby enhance the medium term sustainability of the Eurozone. This approach is not new. It 
was first proposed by John Maynard Keynes in 1942, and designed to share the burden of 
adjustment between debtor and creditor nations, rather than simply the former. This would 
promote Eurozone balance without forcing ultimately unsustainable deflation upon weaker 
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member states. Yet, surprisingly, the Keynes Plan seems to have been overlooked by 
Europe’s policy-makers when seeking creative options to resolve current economic problems 
besetting the single currency. This paper seeks to outline the key features of this approach, 
identify where these may be relevant to the current difficulties facing the Eurozone, and 
indicate how this innovation could contribute towards the resolution of identified structural 
weaknesses. 
 
 
Excessive Reserves and Macroeconomic Consequences 
 
There are multiple motivations for holding international reserves and these do not necessarily 
remain constant over time. Volatility and perceptions of risk tends to influence precautionary 
savings in the form of reserves. Other reasons include high levels of natural resource 
(especially oil) price volatility and/or policy responses to the perceived fragility of the 
international economic system. Substantial reserves allow policy-makers more flexibility in 
responding to periods of economic turbulence. China and Russia were better able to sustain 
the strengths of their economies and, particularly in the former case, launch a sizeable 
Keynesian stimulus package in response to the recent financial crisis, due to the previous 
build-up of reserves (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2010, p. 8). This might be considered as a case 
of macro-precautionary motives, albeit that sometimes the trade policies of both of these 
nations appears to be more inspired by mercantilism. Indeed, Bibow (2010, p. 2) suggests that 
unregulated global finance has encouraged the growth of defensive macroeconomic policies, 
and that this faultline in global financial architecture is unlikely to be rectified without further 
intervention. 
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A second example may derive from the export-led growth model, utilised by, amongst others, 
East Asia, Japan, China and Germany (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2010, p. 10). Structural 
surpluses ensure that other nations endure persistent deficits, given that global trade must 
balance. If surplus nations seek to maintain their current account positions, this makes it more 
difficult for deficit countries to return to balance. This may be reinforced by the combination 
of neoclassical orthodox hegemony and successive World Trade Organisation rounds, which 
have made industrial policy more difficult and hence less attractive. This, in turn, places more 
emphasis upon exchange rate policy or else attempts to reduce wages or the social wage in 
order to improve international competitiveness. By facilitating increased net exports, these 
policies promote trade surpluses, which magnify external imbalances (IMF, 2002, pp. 65-6; 
Bibow, 2010, p. 8; Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2010, p. 8, 11) 
 
To place the issue in context, the reserves held by monetary authorities access the globe more 
than quadrupled over the decade before the recent international financial crisis, rising from 
less than $2 trillion in 1999 to more than $8 trillion in 2009, with developing economies 
accounting for more than two thirds of that increase. This figure is equivalent to in excess of 
12 per cent of world output at market exchange rates (Costabile, 2010, p. 7; Stiglitz and 
Greenwald, 2010, p. 8). Leaving these balances idle creates an opportunity cost, since these 
funds could have been invested in productive activity. Hence, the world economy is poorer 
and with a slower potential growth trajectory as a result (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2010, p. 8). 
This is a large proportion of potential demand to be withdrawn from the global economy, and 
hence current arrangements may arguably produce a ‘chronically unstable global 
macroeconomic situation with a strong deflationary bias’ (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2010, p. 
12). 
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These factors have particular resonance for nations sharing a single currency, where 
exchange rate policy is no longer available, and where the current approach is to utilise a 
combination of deflation and social wage reductions to restore competitiveness in deficit 
nations. Surplus nations such as Germany, which currently has amongst the largest trade 
surpluses in the world, appear determined to persist with export-led growth model(s). This 
insures that other Eurozone members will find it more difficult to improve their own trade 
balances without more drastic action than might otherwise be needed. Moreover, although 
German reserves, built up through this trade policy, are being utilised to provide temporary 
loans to those EU member states suffering fiscal distress, this provides only temporary relief, 
whilst loans are accompanied by demands for quite severe fiscal tightening. The persistence 
of trade surpluses, and the lack of pressure upon governments to take corrective action, 
creates further problems for nations posting trade deficits. There is a need, therefore, to 
examine more fundamental reforms to the global (or regional) financial architecture; the most 
important proposals having been made by Keynes (1980). 
 
 
The Keynes Plan 
 
The Keynes Plan for an International Clearing Union (ICU) originated during discussions 
about the suitability of international economic foundations capable of promoting 
reconstruction and economic prosperity in the aftermath of the Second World War. The 
proposals were developed through a number of drafts, which are outlined in Keynes (1980), 
and cumulated in a UK government white paper in 1942. They were not ultimately adopted in 
full, although elements were included in the establishment of the IMF and the Bretton Woods 
international system of monetary arrangements (Skidelsky, 2000; Steil, 2013).  
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As befits his broader focus upon inadequate effective demand and under-employment of 
resources, Keynes proposed a form of international monetary system which combined the 
benefits of fixed exchange rates (less uncertainty leading to increased investment, trade and 
economic growth) with an attempt to secure an expansionist and not contractionist pressure 
on world trade and international balances (Keynes, 1980, p. 77, 143). In the same way that a 
withdrawal from the circular flow of income, in a particular country, reduces aggregate 
demand and thereby potentially results in under-employment equilibria, he registered concern 
over the inability for an international payments system to prevent excess reserves from 
withdrawing money from the global economy (Keynes, 1980, p. 74-5). If unwarranted by 
reasonable risk assessment, the build-up of excessive reserves equates to hoarding (Keynes, 
1980, p. 273). If surpluses were to remain unused, as would be the case in mercantilist 
strategy, the result would be a sub-optimal level of aggregate demand, insufficient to 
maintain full employment. 
 
Attempts made by deficit nations to restore balance, would exacerbate this problem, through 
deflation and other adjustment programmes (Piffaretti, 2009b, p. 47). Domestic deflation and 
devaluation, both of which seek to reduce the international price of exports relative to 
imports, with the elasticities of demand for imported and exported goods and services 
determining whether a modest or very large correction would be required to restore balance 
(Keynes, 1980, p. 29). Deflation will reduce the demand for imports, as a result of declining 
wages (or the social wage, via reductions in welfare expenditure) and/or increasing 
unemployment, whilst devaluation makes exports cheaper overseas and encourages import-
substitution at home.  
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The Keynes Plan, therefore, sought to devise an international monetary structure which 
would dissuade (or prevent) nations from pursuing mercantilism and thereby facilitate 
national aggregate demand management to secure full employment (Bibow, 2010, p. 26). 
Moreover, if all nations were to maintain their expenditure levels sufficient to secure full 
employment, this, in turn, should reduce the probability of individual nations suffering 
persistent balance of payments problems (Kalecki, 1946, p. 323-7). Net foreign expenditure 
would be financed through international long term lending; the latter to be facilitated through 
the establishment of an international clearing union, similar to Keynes’ proposals, combined 
with an international investment office. Hence, ‘the plan aims at the substitution of an 
expansionist, in place of a contractionist, pressure on world trade’ (Keynes, 1942; Keynes, 
1980, p. 46-8, 74-5). 
 
The ICU proposal sought to establish an international system of payments which facilitated 
global full employment. The proposal had six main elements, namely: 
 Establishment of a currency union, based on international bank money  
 Creation of a closed payments system, enabling central banks to regulate the flow of 
international payments 
 Restrictions upon speculative and other short term flows of capital 
 The need for symmetric not asymmetric rebalancing 
 Ensuring that international reserves are limited and re-circulated 
 Ability to readjust fixed exchange rate values to reflect changes in efficiency wages 
 
‘Bancor’ Currency Union 
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The ICU would utilise a form of international bank money (‘bancor’), which would be fixed, 
at least nominally in terms of gold, with national currencies within the ICU, and thereby fixed 
in relation to one another.  The purpose of the new currency would be to settle international 
balances between participating member states, through accounts maintained by national 
central banks. Those nations with a surplus on their balance of payments account, with 
respect to other ICU participants, would accrue a credit account, whereas those with a 
balance of payments deficit would generate a debit account. Bancor would not necessarily be 
utilised for all transactions between individual businesses or banks, but rather would be the 
sole means of settling the final outstanding balances between the central banks of each 
participating nation. 
 
The supply of bancor was to be perfectly elastic up to the maximum set for each country 
(Meltzer, 1983, p. 17). Moreover, there would be one-way convertability only, from gold or 
national currencies to bancor (Keynes, 1942; 1980, p. 95, 140). Thus, bancor reserves never 
leave the system, thereby negating the possibility of a run on the currency (Arestis, 1999, p. 
7). Furthermore, one of the main design features of the bancor system was the attempt to 
avoid the accumulation of inactive balances held in individual national reserves. Bancor was, 
therefore, meant to be a means of payment but not a store of value (Meltzer, 1983, p. 17). 
 
Creation of a Closed Payments System 
 
The purpose of the ICU would be to extend the banking principle that exists within any 
closed system, namely that the sum of credits and debits (assets and liabilities) must balance 
(Keynes, 1980, p. 44, 72, 201). If credits are not permitted to exit the system, then the ICU 
will form the equivalent of its own circular flow of income, with demand maintained by 
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preventing withdrawals. This would require that the provision of foreign exchange would be 
located solely within the central bank of each participating nation. Where requested by 
individuals or businesses, other domestic banks would be required to apply to the central 
banks for release of these funds. This could operate through intermediaries, through a system 
of licences, but the settlement of ultimate outstanding balances would occur between central 
banks, which would have unqualified control over outward transactions of national citizens 
(Keynes, 1980, p. 33-4, 125). The focal position of central banks within the ICU proposal 
largely reflected the position pertaining in the UK at the time Keynes was drafting the ICU 
proposals, although it would require a significant reversal of contemporary reality, where 
international financial markets operate without this restraint. 
 
Capital Controls 
 
A closed payments system would require the reintroduction of capital controls, to prevent 
unregulated flows from undermining the ICU system. Indeed, Keynes (1980, p. 30-1, 52, 65, 
86-7, 129-30, 148-50, 185-6) argued that ‘nothing is more certain’ than the need for ‘central 
control of capital movements, both inward and outward’ to be a ‘permanent feature of the 
post war system’, requiring ‘exchange control for all transactions’. Payments arising from 
trade would be automatically permitted, and capital flows financing fixed investment would 
be treated more favourably than speculative capital flows, which would be prohibited 
(Keynes, 1980, p. 52-3, 87, 212-3; Riese, 2008, p. 39). Hence, an ICU would eliminate what 
may be regarded as the ‘wasteful’ foreign exchange activities of multinational banks, thereby 
curbing speculation and reducing the volatility in currencies that hamper economic activity in 
the real economy (D’Arista (2003, p. 737). 
 
11 
 
Melitz (1983, p. 23) argued that Keynes became convinced that no international monetary 
system was capable of achieving internal and external stability, high employment and 
economic freedom, and therefore he chose to sacrifice freedom through the introduction of a 
permanent system of exchange controls. The combination of fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates, capital controls and multilateral clearing, was intended to smooth the trade cycle and 
facilitate the expansion of trade, thereby setting the foundations for the maintenance of an 
expansionist not contractionist global economy. With idle balances being put to productive 
use, an ICU, protected by capital controls, could facilitate a higher level of international 
effective demand without inflationary consequences (Keynes, 1980, p. 155). Higher 
international aggregate demand should further ease the pressure on deficit nations, thereby 
reducing tensions in the international payments system. Capital controls would, moreover, 
facilitate domestic macroeconomic management (Meltzer, 1983, p. 14-15). 
 
Symmetric Rebalancing 
 
Given that the sum of the worldwide balance of payments must be zero, such that the sum of 
all surpluses must equal the sum of all deficits within a set period of time, surpluses cannot 
exist without an equivalent deficit occurring elsewhere in the world. Therefore, if the latter 
are a problem, the former must be a significant contributor to this problem occurring and 
persisting. This should imply that both surplus and deficit countries should be treated equally, 
in seeking to eliminate such trade imbalances, but this is not typically the case. Deficit 
countries endure compulsion to reduce trade imbalances, whilst surplus countries do not. 
Moreover, since problems with debtor countries can only occur, according to Keynes, if 
creditor countries are not making full use of the purchasing power derived from their trade 
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surplus, surplus countries are guilty of exporting deflationary consequences to other nations 
(Keynes, 1980; Richardson, 1985, p. 24; Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2006, p. 11; 2010, p. 6-7). 
 
The ICU therefore sought to prevent systematic disequilibria by creating a system of 
incentives and penalties, to be imposed on both deficit and surplus countries, meant to 
discourage disequilibria (Costabile, 2010, p. 18-19; Keynes, 1980, p. 78-81). In this 
endeavour, the ICU would mimic the actions of national central banks, in pursuing 
international ‘symmetric rebalancing’, and thereby achieving simultaneous debtor and 
creditor adjustment (Piffaretti, 2009b, p. 46). 
 
Each national central bank would be allocated an index-quota equal to the sum of its imports 
and exports, averaged over the previous five years and would be entitled to overdraw its 
clearing account by up to the value of its index account. If a deficit remained above one 
quarter of the index value for more than a year, the ‘deficiency bank’ would be allowed to 
borrow from the clearing account of a bank running a surplus, whilst the deficit nation would 
be entitled to devalue its exchange rate by up to 5 per cent per year. If the deficit exceeded 
half the index quota, this devaluation would be required, whilst outward movements of 
capital would be prohibited without the express permission of the governors of the central 
bank itself. 
 
Meanwhile, surplus banks would be encouraged or (if the surplus balance exceeded 50 per 
cent of the index quota), required to introduce corrective measures, involving currency 
appreciation, to the maximum of 5 per cent per annum, or easing the restrictions upon the 
outward flow of capital. At the year end, surplus balances still exceeding the value of the 
index quota would be transferred to the reserve fund of the central bank. In addition, surplus 
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nations would be caused to transfer into the central bank’s reserve fund 5 per cent of the 
annual excess above one quarter of its index quota, and 10 per cent above half the quota 
figure (Keynes, 1980, p. 35-7). In essence, this imposed the equivalent of a rate of interest 
upon credit balances, in the attempt to provide a deterrent against the development of a 
persistent surplus position. In later drafts, this element was reluctantly dropped albeit that this 
element of the proposal may have particular relevance to the circumstances facing the 
Eurozone (Keynes, 1980, p. 96). 
 
Utilisation of Reserves to Promote Investment 
 
Given that idle balances represent unused purchasing power, the ICU determined to prevent 
their build-up and ensure that such credit balances were recycled and utilised if holders were 
unwilling to do this themselves. Keynes expected that the threat of lost potential purchasing 
power would ensure that surplus nations used their otherwise idle balances to create 
productive capacity abroad - through FDI or through allowing the ICU to loan the funds to 
deficit nations. Or, alternatively, they would prevent accumulation of idle balances in the first 
place, by boosting domestic demand. The point of the ‘use it or lose it’ clause was to prevent 
creditor nations from remaining passive and placing all adjustment burdens upon deficit 
nations (Keynes, 1980, p. 49, 117). 
 
Nevertheless, in the absence of creditor nation action, the ICU retained the ability to make 
use of any credit balances that surplus nations choose to remain idle, and recycle them 
through offering loans to deficit nations, thereby maintaining a sufficient level of effective 
demand adequate to maintain full employment within the clearing union (Riese, 2008, p. 39). 
Hoarding would not be permitted. Moreover, there would be no cost to surplus nations, since 
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they had chosen not to use these resources themselves, and hence the ICU could invest these 
idle balances in much the same way as a domestic bank with savings accounts (Keynes, 1980, 
p. 113). Thus, Kalecki and Schumacher (1943) believed that the combination of an ICU and 
institutional investment office should be sufficient to provide sufficient short- and long-term 
lending to prevent unsustainable foreign exchange problems. 
 
Exchange Rate Adjustment 
 
Whilst the ICU was conceived as supporting a fixed exchange rate system, it is important to 
note that Keynes did not view this fix as unalterable (Keynes, 1942). Devaluation would, 
therefore, be permitted if efficiency wages increased relative to wages abroad (Meltzer, 1983, 
p. 19; Keynes, 1980, p. 274). 
 
Issues Arising from the Keynes Plan 
 
Many of the initial reactions to the Keynes Plan are documented elsewhere (de Vegh, 1943; 
Horsefield, 1969; Keynes, 1980; Riese, 2008). However, there were a number of issues, 
arising out of the Plan, identified as potentially problematic for the adoption and operation of 
the scheme. 
 
The first relates to relations between ICU participants and non-members. Given that the ICU 
was devised as a means of resolving problems for the global economy, it would operate more 
smoothly if all nation states participated. However, this was always going to be unlikely. 
Consequently, the ICU would have to accommodate trade between member and non-member 
states. If non-ICU nations wish to trade with ICU member states – and there is a presumption 
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that they would if they had an existing trade surplus with these nations – then they would 
need to establish an account with the Clearing Bank. Ultimate balances would be cleared 
between central banks of member and non-member states alike, through Clearing Bank 
accounts (Keynes, 1980, pp. 61-2). Nations generating a trade surplus with the ICU would 
hold a credit balance, and those with a trade deficit, a debit account, which they would have 
to settle through transfer of foreign exchange or other assets (Keynes, 1980, p. 176, 223). 
 
There is a question as to whether non-member states would wish to trade with the ICU, since 
they would be subject to the same rules as members but without influence. The significance 
of this relationship can be noted from the latest trade balances between Eurozone (and, more 
widely, EU) member states and the rest of the world (see Table 1). However, withdrawing 
from trade relationships with ICU member states would be damaging to non-participants. 
Nations running a trade deficit with ICU members could not maintain an overdraft facility, 
and hence would have to settle their accounts into the Clearing Bank using any previous 
bancor credits or utilising other financial securities. For nations running a surplus, if they 
chose to retain credit balances unused, there would be little practical difference, albeit that 
these would have to be held in bancor, rather than their own currencies, except that excess 
reserves would be recycled and used within the clearing union, thereby maintaining potential 
purchasing power in those nations buying exported goods from surplus nations. If, however, 
the surplus nations chose to use these balances themselves, they would be restricted to occur 
within the ICU and not withdrawn from the clearing union (Keynes, 1980, p. 83, 112, 122). 
 
TABLE 1 TO GO HERE 
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A second, related point concerns the position of surplus nations within the ICU. As a 
voluntary system, from which nations can decline to participate or withdraw subject to one 
year’s notice (and leaving any credit balances within the clearing union), surplus nations will 
necessarily require benefits of some kind to outweigh the costs related to the restrictions upon 
behaviour that the ICU would impose (Riddle, 1943, p. 15). The most powerful argument 
relates to disquiet concerning the stability and long term sustainability of present international 
payments arrangements. Historical evidence would seem to suggest that disproportionate 
loading of adjustment costs upon deficit nations has been a fundamental flaw in previous 
fixed currency systems (Keynes, 1980, p. 27). Thus, surplus nations (i.e. Germany, Czech 
Republic) cannot continue to prosper, in the long term, by causing their trading partners (i.e. 
Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) to respond through deflation. Reduced demand, in deficit 
nations, reduces the exports of surplus nations unless they respond through their own internal 
deflation, thereby initiating a further beggar-thy-neighbour deflationary spiral. The ICU 
would provide a longer term sustainable solution to this dilemma for surplus nations (Keynes, 
1980, p. 276). 
 
Surplus nations may, furthermore, benefit through any promotion of deeper economic 
integration, especially in relation to the completion of the single market, arising from the 
introduction of the ICU programme (Keynes, 1980, p. 121). In addition, the ability of the ICU 
to prevent deflation and reductions in social wages across a large swathe of the Eurozone – 
undertaken in order to promote international competitiveness (due, in no small part, to 
persistent trade imbalances) – would promote the social solidarity across the EU which seems 
rather lacking at present. 
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A third issue is related to the first, in that nations are reluctant to surrender sovereignty in 
economic matters. Keynes (1942) dismissed this as necessitating no greater loss than might 
occur under a standard commercial treaty. However, his claim would appear to be a little 
disingenuous, as commercial contracts do not restrict what one party can do with the 
proceeds of the activity, in the way that the ICU would impose upon creditor nations. Indeed, 
he acknowledged that the post-war world would require a “greater surrender of sovereign 
rights” than had been accepted to that point (Keynes, 1980, p. 57). Instead, he argued that the 
discipline inherent within the ICU system would be advantageous, since it encouraged nation 
states to reject “indiscipline, disorder and bad neighbourliness” which had so often operated 
to the general disadvantage of all nations concerned (Keynes, 1980, p. 57-8). It, furthermore, 
implied the creation of a new instrument of economic leadership and economic governance, 
which could assist in the promotion of global economic development and macroeconomic 
management (de Vegh, 1943, p. 544, 547; Keynes, 1980, p. 58-60, 90-2, 131-3). 
 
A fourth issue arising from the ICU proposal, and one that Keynes identified as perhaps the 
most difficult issue to resolve, relates to the demarcation of rules and discretion in the design 
of the system (Keynes, 1980, p. 73, 116-7). In his early drafts of the Plan, Keynes erred on 
the side of designing a rule-based system, capable of restraining economic indiscipline, 
whereas in later drafts, he softened this stance, due to peer feedback, in order to allow greater 
discretion for government policy to adapt to circumstances and take whatever measures were 
necessary at the time Keynes, 1980, p. 48, 78). He noted the theoretical preference for rules, 
but that discretion is probably necessary to make the system work more effectively in practice 
(Keynes, 1980, p. 97, 116). Indeed, he remained essentially undecided about the balance 
between rule and discretion, concluding that it might be finally determined after the scheme 
had been enacted for an initial experimental period of a few years (Keynes, 1980, p. 117). 
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In terms of the choice of a supranational body which has the strength and authority to be able 
to manage an international monetary system, Davidson has suggested two alternatives. In the 
first, a closed, double-entry bookkeeping clearing institution might be sufficient to keep track 
of net international payment positions between participating trading nations, and monitor 
compliance with the mutually agreed rules intended to solve problems of persistent trade and 
payments imbalances (Davidson, 2009, p. 136-142). His second suggestion would be to 
utilise the format of a central bank, similar to the current European Central Bank (ECB), in 
order to take advantage of the acceptance and credibility associated with an existing format, 
albeit that it would have to embrace rather different objectives (Davidson, 1992, p. 8). At the 
minimum, this would require the ECB to enshrine payments balance as a core part of its 
mandate, but, additionally, to seek to operate the ICU to secure and maintain full employment 
within the Euro-ICU zone (Davidson, 1992; Arestis, 1999, p. 9). This would necessitate a 
radical reform in ECB structure, strategic objectives and its willingness to use a broader use 
of differential policy tools, before it would be an acceptable conduit. 
 
A final issue concerns potential inflationary effects arising from the operation of the ICU. For 
example, Meltzer (1983, p. 19) claims that Keynes was aware of the possible inflationary bias 
of his scheme, due to an excess supply of money, but that this flaw was not addressed. He 
suggests that this may have been because the scheme was unlikely to be accepted by the 
American negotiators at the Bretton Woods summit. The argument is advanced that the ICU 
provides surplus nations with an incentive to expand their economy, rather than allow build-
up of surpluses triggering an exchange rate appreciation. If the economy was already 
operating at full employment, this would be inflationary. Similarly, persistent deficit nations 
would be expected to devalue, which would improve the competitiveness of their exports but 
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also provide an expansionary effect. In combination, these two measures would provide a 
stimulus to economic activity across the ICU. If economies were already operating at full 
employment levels, then this would be inflationary. 
 
This critique ignores the basic starting point which led to the development of the Keynes Plan 
in the first place, namely that the operation of the current international payments system – 
through asymmetric treatment of deficit and surplus nations, alongside the amassing of idle 
reserves – has a profound deflationary effect upon the global economy (Keynes, 1980, p. 46-
8, 60, 74-7, 112-3). The ICU was supposed to reverse this effect, thereby providing better 
global balance. Moreover, it would do so with no burden placed upon surplus nations 
(Keynes, 1980, p. 112, 115). If this analysis is correct, then it is likely that the global 
economy would ‘run hotter’, with less wasted resources, and the varied evidence arising from 
Phillips Curve, NAIRU and other policy trade-off analysis, would indicate that inflationary 
pressures may arise at slightly less than full employment equilibrium. Nevertheless, even if 
this analysis is correct, this is more of a problem for the correct use of macroeconomic policy 
tools, rather than a justification to reject the ICU system. 
 
 
Relevance to the EU in 2013 
 
Having outlined the fundamental elements of the Keynes Plan, the relevance to the 
difficulties faced by the Eurozone, in 2013, should be obvious to the reader. The current 
asymmetry of economic development, within the Eurozone, and the resulting internal 
imbalances, threaten to undermine the solidarity that underpins the European project (Bibow, 
2007, p. 31). The experience of previous fixed exchange rate regimes would suggest that 
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loading the burden of adjustment upon weaker (deficit) nations, such as Greece or Portugal as 
at present, exacerbates tensions and facilitates political or popular opposition. Moreover, 
reliance upon export-led growth, to compensate for inadequate domestic levels of aggregate 
demand, relies upon external economies continuing to accept symmetrical trade deficits. 
Neither of these factors is likely to persist in the long term, and the Eurozone is not currently 
constructed to contribute towards the unwinding of imbalances, and thereby reducing the 
threat to its sustainability (Bibow, 2007, p. 34). 
 
Were an ICU reform to be introduced, the asymmetric nature of the current Eurozone rescue 
plans, which dampen demand in already struggling member states and provide only 
temporary relief, could be exchanged for a system which would automatically ensure a 
symmetric rebalancing of the Eurozone. There would be fewer macro-precautionary reasons 
for holding idle reserves, with consequent loss of potential purchasing power within the 
Eurozone, as an ICU would facilitate a more expansive European economy, with fewer 
inherent trade-related tensions and lower perceptions of risks associated with deflationary 
policies necessitated by trade imbalances. Creditor nations would be encouraged to either 
increase the economic activity in their own economies, and thereby suck in more imports and 
thereby reduce excess surplus balances or, if already at or near full employment, to spend 
these reserves in debtor nations, through direct investment (FDI) or the provision of foreign 
aid. Otherwise, the ICU would ensure that excess credit balances would be utilised, perhaps 
through a European Investment Foundation, as suggested by Arestis (1999, p. 9-10). 
Whatever the method chosen, the result should be the union experiencing a higher level of 
aggregate demand, as resources are not withdrawn as the result of a build-up of reserves or 
deflation imposed upon deficit nations, and thereby growth should rise and unemployment 
fall across participating member states. 
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One advantage that the EU has, over supporters of the original Keynes Plan in the 1940s, is 
that part of the infrastructure necessary for the operation of the scheme is already in place. 
The ECB already exists as an accepted supranational economic authority, and as such, this 
could form the basis for the clearing agency proposed by Keynes to manage the clearing 
union. 
 
The adoption of an ICU would, however, not be without significant difficulties. The first of 
these relates to the current state of the international finance system. Compared to the more 
managed economies characterising the period in which Keynes developed his ideas, 
contemporary central banks are far less in control of the creation of credit and the 
establishment of interest rates (Arestis, 1999, p. 9). Liberalisation and the subsequent 
internationalisation of financial markets have combined to weaken the control of central 
banks. Nevertheless, the necessity to regulate financial capital has been amply demonstrated 
by the recent global financial crisis. Writing in advance of this event, Cartapanis and Herland 
(2002, p. 273-4) were already observing that ‘rarely in the course of history has the 
international markets experienced such violent adjustments’ as had been experienced in the 
previous decade. Indeed, the IMF has documented 124 systemic banking crises since the 
demise of Bretton Woods (Laeven and Valencia, 2008, p. 5). One significant factor 
underpinning this increase in financial volatility has been the liberalisation of capital 
movements (Cartapanis and Herland, 2002, p. 274). Consequently, re-regulation of 
international financial capital movements would appear overdue. This, however, is 
problematic due to the hegemonic dominance of neo-classical orthodoxy, which does not 
seem to have been as fatally wounded by the crisis as might have been anticipated. 
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Capital restrictions would additionally, at least superficially, appear to conflict with the ‘four 
freedoms’ enshrined in the Treaty of Rome; one of which being the freedom of movement of 
capital. The clearing union would have, at its heart, restrictions upon the convertibility of 
currencies into bancor and the regulation of the supranational clearing agency authority of all 
capital movements not related directly to trade or long term productive investment. This 
would necessarily constrain the freedom of movement of capital. However, the EU has never 
been absolutist in its adherence to these principles, when they conflict with other objectives. 
For example, current discussions regarding the advisability of introducing a form of Tobin 
tax (1978), to prevent short term speculative financial transactions from undermining 
economic stability, would imply that the principle of freedom of movement of capital is not 
sacrosanct. Moreover, the ICU proposal would encourage the expansion of international trade 
in goods and services, alongside long term productive investment, so it would only be short 
term capital movements which would be severely curtailed. This would not hamper the 
completion of the European single internal market and, indeed, may facilitate its progress. 
 
Fundamental change of theoretical underpinning for the ECB would, moreover, be required 
in addition to a radical revision of its objectives. Thus, the narrow focus upon low inflation 
would need to be superseded by the task of managing the clearing union and, as a 
consequence, to prioritise the facilitation of full employment across the union. This is 
incompatible with a theoretical adherence to economic orthodoxy, with a neo-liberal flavour, 
and hence the ECB and its officers would need to accept the tenants of Keynesian theory. 
This will prove problematic, given the dominance of orthodox economic perspectives in the 
finance sector and, albeit to a lesser extent, to academia; the two areas from which potential 
ECB officials might be drawn. Nevertheless, given the importance of the new institution for 
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the success of the new policy orientation, sufficient candidates could be found amongst the 
minority heterodox economist communities. 
 
There is, however, one final and potentially even more difficult problem for the EU, in 
adopting an ICU proposal, and that arises from the pre-existing single currency, on to which a 
clearing union would need to be grafted. Whilst the symmetrical rebalancing facilitated via 
the ICU should reduce problems arising from large and persistent surpluses and deficits 
(Keynes, 1980, p. 77), it was envisaged that any remaining fundamental trade imbalances 
through changes in exchange rates. However, this is not available for a clearing union formed 
between nations sharing a single currency. Advocates of the ICU therefore have two 
alternatives – to amend the original Keynes Plan to incorporate the single currency, and 
create what might be termed an ‘ICU-light’ version of the scheme, or to advocate a 
comprehensive implementation of the scheme, based more closely to the original design. 
 
In terms of an ‘ICU-light’ variant, the Euro could either become the international banking 
currency or else a separate currency, perhaps named the Eurobancor, could be established. In 
either case, this could operate much as in the Keynes Plan, with each nation having a clearing 
account to settle net balances between Eurozone participants, with one-way convertibility of 
their domestic currencies (in this case, the Euro for each nation) and the clearing account. For 
those creditor economies, limitations would be placed upon the size of the credit balances in 
the clearing account, and similarly for deficit nations, and once these were reached, corrective 
action would be required. 
 
Greater emphasis would be placed upon the automatic stabilisation arising from the operation 
of the ICU, as surplus nations would be encouraged to reflate their own economies to the 
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point of full employment and/or use remaining resources for productive investment in deficit 
nations. It should be noted, however, that FDI may displace as well as supplement existing 
productive activity in the host nation (Moran et al, 2005). Consequently, in the absence of 
internal devaluation, whose likely requirement for deficit nations to lower social wages in 
order to restore competitiveness would be contrary to the essence of the Keynes Plan, this 
may require repeated FDI transfers from surplus to deficit nations, which may test the 
solidarity necessary for the success of the scheme. Thus, in the absence of exchange rate 
modification, the ‘ICU-light’ approach may require the development of supplementary policy 
instruments to strengthen the scheme where automatic stabilisation is insufficiently strong. 
 
To take one example, if Germany has a large surplus, and Greece a deficit, with other 
members of the clearing union, it is not possible to attempt to rectify differentials in 
international competitiveness through the means of appreciating the German currency relative 
to Greece, since they both share the Euro. The operation of the ICU would require Germany 
to use its surplus either to increase domestic activity towards full employment or to use this in 
the form of overseas investment (or aid) in Greece. This may not be straightforward, 
however, as German memory of the hyperinflationary episode, in the 1930s, would cause 
resistance to the former recommendation. Nevertheless, even without occasional exchange 
rate revaluation, the ‘ICU-light’ option could still make a useful contribution to the present 
Eurozone crisis. 
 
It would still require much tighter financial regulation, with central bank control over 
financial flows limiting the destabilising effect arising from short term speculative flows. 
Moreover, since surpluses would be built up within the clearing union payments system, and 
could not be withdrawn from the system, these funds would be made available to finance 
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productive investment in deficit nations. Additional incentives could be introduced to 
encourage creditor nations to expand their domestic demand rather than continue to build up 
surpluses. This could include the requirement to transfer excess account balances into a 
special holding account in the supranational clearing union institution, which could either pay 
no interest (hence imposing a real terms cost) or else consider the imposition of a negative 
interest rate, payable by the creditor nation, upon these excess balances. If this achieved its 
aim, and surplus nations inflated their economies, this would achieve a form of internal 
devaluation capable of gradually shifting relative competitive positions, although this would 
be slower and potentially more disruptive than the exchange rate alternative not available to 
members of a single currency. The ‘ICU-light’ version of the Keynes Plan would, therefore, 
achieve many of the stated goals. 
 
The full variant would, however, be a superior solution, yet, for this to be achieved, there 
would need to be some form of reintroduction of national currencies in order for the 
rebalancing to work more effectively. In this scenario, each member of the Eurozone would 
possess their individual currency, and use the Euro as their international bank currency 
intended to resolve balance of payments. As credit or debit balances grew, the option of 
encouraged or enforced currency revaluation and devaluation would be possible, thereby 
securing a quicker and more effective symmetric rebalancing of the clearing union than could 
be accomplished through the alternative plethora of incentives, outlined in the previous 
paragraph. The ‘ICU-full’ version, therefore, would incorporate all of the main aspects of the 
original Keynes Plan, namely symmetric rebalancing, a closed system of payments combined 
with capital controls, and the combination of the bank currency with the retention of national 
currencies, thereby enabling exchange rate revision to reflect changes in competitiveness. 
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This would require the EU Commission and Eurozone participants to acknowledge that the 
present form of EMU is fatally flawed – and neither politicians nor economists appear to 
welcome having to admit previous mistakes. A new economic framework would be required, 
placing payments balance at the heart of the new union, and with supranational economic 
institutions given the mandate to manage the ‘ICU-full’ scheme. However, once this step has 
been taken, the future for this alternative vision of a currency union has greater potential for 
long term sustainability. It would be possible, for example, for shifts in international 
competitiveness to be swiftly dealt with, in the absence of painful adjustment that stretched 
internal solidarity. It would also encourage the Eurozone economy to operate closer to full 
employment, with faster rates of economic growth, which would mark a significant 
improvement over achievements since the advent of the Euro. Moreover, the creation of a 
more flexible system, in which the objectives of employment and economic prosperity 
dominate over financial considerations, might encourage more nations to participate in the 
system. The UK, for example, would find it easier to consider membership of a clearing 
union of this type, rather than the current version of EMU. 
 
This is not to suggest that the ICU would prove to be a panacea for all economic problems 
facing the European economy. However it has the potential to provide a superior alternative 
to the present solutions (Arestis, 1999, p. 1). Perhaps it might be time for EU economists and 
policy-makers to dust off their copies of the Keynes Plan and familiarise themselves with the 
contents – it might prove instructive. 
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Table 1 – Trade Balance for Eurozone members, January 2014 (€10million) 
 Austria Belgium Cyprus Estonia EU Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Latvia Luxem Malta Netherlan
ds 
Portugal Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia Spain 
Austria 0 165.939 -4.85048 -9.78085 2026.3 -32.0466 -258.248 2281.79 -31.3706 22.3367 -40.82 -16.39975 9.7553 -1.92428 561.799 -2.8667 -72.211 -80.281 17.149 
Belgium 
-135.823 0 -16.62144 -5.1381 -2068.7 -20.576 -3302.21 -1708.39 -129.1432 1602.865 -541.66 -12.3143 -566.896 -7.69678 3865 2.094 21.7785 -25.6306 -168.485 
Cyprus 8.95441 12.5936 0 0.20869 467.352 2.08782 48.05643 58.6327 110.069 3.89277 58.1008 4.25412 2.38517 -1.0151 51.7014 2.86268 0.95798 1.6654 32.48198 
Estonia 9.88213 18.116 0.03979 0 534.409 7.474 19.2345 137.8026 0.43095 1.52416 39.2025 36.519 0.73692 -0.3516 51.076 1.23861 1.65059 3.41982 4.7939 
Euro area 
-2486.26 428.7 -367.6521 -192.419 0 -676.83 -11455.4 669 -1233.58 3127.3 -561.9 -271.284 -768.14 -293.91 20127.2 -1198.76 534.22 -91.9 -271.6 
EU 
-1996.4 1549.3 -423.7425 -328.29 8575 -908.68 -11812 6381.7 -1350.57 2792.23 1157.5 -458.005 -648.7 -348.625 22981.8 -1121.8 1079.13 103.79 183.2 
Finland 0.346 30.088 -1.73044 -13.392 716.56 0 -8.365 282.99 1.7779 31.0524 17.759 -40.1078 5.48736 0.67511 192.878 10.9476 2.4332 0.0043 -31.5385 
France 275.065 2331.21 -42.05879 -10.0748 14249 -2.104 0 4666.18 -186.6 330.899 1496.02 -22.8945 9.837 -9.3996 3300.09 210.591 174.305 31.385 1025.31 
Germany 
-2349.48 1594.03 -47.3561 -108.9301 -2261.1 -383.287 -3599.39 0 -364.974 460.835 -813.93 -95.768 -251.506 4.3585 8932.66 -103.132 299.27 120.985 -797.16 
Greece 
32.6252 121.0184 -119.4382 0.05983 1393.15 -7.1319 216.6619 381.544 0 30.06784 272.711 -0.36176 14.66114 
-
11.24946 232.8382 12.8407 12.58704 -8.66352 80.8392 
Ireland 
-12.3112 
-
1714.806 -1.74924 -2.53342 -3190.19 -50.1801 -406.874 -331.998 -32.37364 0 -241.967 -2.21889 -3.85427 -1.58503 -234.182 -52.5377 -6.0721 -3.5434 
-
342.2183 
Italy 
-35.17 603.48 -55.49157 -16.0375 550.7 -30.419 -834.52 969.09 -243.568 248.0668 0 -63.8244 56.1312 
-
232.2562 1869.55 -165.007 73.731 -142.788 -8.38 
Latvia 15.71572 17.0735 -0.06506 -11.491 415.829 26.3536 6.5695 85.9431 0.1384 3.43248 42.2915 0 0.72525 -0.18034 -20.7489 0.18238 14.47304 3.80033 15.73761 
Luxembourg 
-23.6456 467.524 -0.78238 -1.08605 543.15 -4.15823 -35.017 286.016 -14.53968 1.63029 -66.1348 -1.14513 0 0.01368 127.4223 -2.78734 -1.66217 -6.4777 -33.2533 
Malta 2.87267 3.5138 -0.34956 0.85505 321.073 0.06627 19.8338 -2.6392 7.9239 1.86614 193.3358 0.7496 0.39093 0 21.5816 -0.95457 1.38561 0.56716 20.9475 
Netherlands 
-440.87 -3477.34 -46.94938 -26.9269 -18835.5 -155.369 -2487.55 -7128.3 -237.7991 79.258 -1448.85 -23.2651 -65.8655 -12.7493 0 -108.067 -4.267 -26.2014 -889.27 
Portugal 8.9548 1.481 -1.88512 -0.19418 1188.79 -17.3029 -149.43 159.037 -13.8129 33.9051 182.136 -1.31817 -1.24292 0.32301 172.799 0 5.5222 0.7972 836.04 
Slovak 
Republic 70.074 9.895 -1.34337 -0.66438 -287.26 -4.6453 -108.857 -283.92 -6.55046 2.80475 -41.621 -9.66268 0.31124 -0.11063 27.165 -4.7562 0 62.4216 -43.5122 
Slovenia 61.88 37.429 -0.52358 -3.19751 109.77 1.0297 -34.381 -106.18 7.7075 2.20772 200.491 -3.74311 2.85447 -0.287 48.318 0.42025 -27.8788 0 24.6618 
Spain 
40.375 224.518 -26.56171 4.4132 699.5 19.7337 -534.26 1007.39 -100.7584 274.0875 173.42 -19.78338 18.6815 
-
20.65497 906.508 -999.64 52.6803 -19.554 0 
World 
-1467.5 -451.8 -564.939 -130.55 -15108 -393.9 -10353.9 17168 -2775.64 5012.6 3662.7 -331.69 -852.43 -340.317 5347.5 -1409.79 63.73 6.92 -4402.9 
(IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, Data Extracted on 24 January 2014 from UKDS.stat, http://dx.doi.org/10.5257/imf/dots/2014-01). 
 
